

Oct 25, 1962 (WH typing)

#### Political path

This path has several branches, both as to the forum in which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps to be taken.

With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and this could be combined with private approaches on the side. We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or indicate agreement to proposals publicly made.

Another method would be to propose or have someone such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev. He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting in his letter to Bertrand Russell and could not have been expected, at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine and would be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile bases in Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to our stopping one of their ships.

As a background for political action that would have any hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying out the quarantine.

The following political actions might be considered:

1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other.
2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.
3. Approach to Castro

An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Ambassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction. It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that only two subjects were not negotiable between the US and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions of any kind in Latin America.

If the Castro Government considers it has no freedom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.

Comment on K letter of 26 Oct, 27 Oct, and JFK reply of 8 pm 27 Oct

1. K simply doesn't make any offer to withdraw missiles; he says that given commitment, ~~would~~ he would make commitment ~~not~~ that Sov vessels bound for Cuba ((at the moment? or indefinitely!)) would not carry weapons; and that there would no longer be any "necessity" for Sov specialists, or armaments. But SU had already said--on Sept 11--that they had no "necessity" for missiles on Cuba: with which we could agree. This is--evidently--not tantamount to saying that they wouldn't put them there, or once there, would take them out.

2. The Oct 27 letter is, in fact, quite compatible with the Oct 26 letter (though not with F-S exchange). If missiles were "necessary," then a trade with Turkish missiles wouldn't be acceptable, so far as Cuba were concerned. But if they weren't necessary...they were available for bargaining; removal of the Turkish missiles would justify the trouble of taking them out.

3. The JFK letter purports to read into the Oct 26 letter certain proposals--but these couldn't possibly be read into that letter. They just aren't there. This would be known not only to K but to anyone in Moscow who knew the K letter. If the ~~the~~ letter had ~~had~~ been published shortly, the effect would have been most peculiar. What JFK was really referring to was the F offer. (Did K explain this ploy in his interview with Y?)



*Crisis*

## BLACK PREDICTIONS

1. Predictions on the likelihood of events or the outcomes of certain policies are often given officially which diverge sharply from the private beliefs of the advisors. These predictions may be, tacitly or explicitly, conditional upon certain "assumptions" which the makers privately believe to be unrealistic.
2. These unrealistic assumptions--about the decisions or goals of the President, the behavior of the US government, the attitudes of the US public, the performance of our troops or commanders, the efficiency or speed of the decision-making process or response mechanisms, the decisions or effectiveness of allies--may be used because more realistic assumptions are "tabu," barred from explicit or even implicit employment.
3. Avoidance of "tabu" assumptions may be convenient because it simplifies the analysis, or because it leads to conclusions and recommendations that are desired and that cannot be challenged without questioning the "official acceptable" assumptions. But to the "layman" (often, the superior asking for the prediction) the unrealism of the conclusions may not be apparent; he may not realize the sensitivity of the conclusions to the "OK assumptions." He may really be led astray. And even if he tries to elicit a more realistic analysis, the predictor may not be willing to draw out the consequences of more realistic assumptions: because those assumptions really are tabu, because they are rarely used and lead to surprising and shocking results, or because they lead to prescriptions that he opposes (and you can't force him to think these particular forbidden thoughts officially--that is practically an "illegal order").
4. Examples: assumptions that the President might accede to an ultimatum, or that ~~the~~ an ally might; that the US public might virtually rebel at a US policy; or less dramatically, that a policy might be pursued at high or low levels irresolutely, waveringly, inconsistently, that decision times might be very long or response times very long, that internal conflict might produce erratic behavior, etc.
5. Even to voice these possibilities is tabu: because certain thoughts are forbidden and "disloyal"; because to believe them is ~~dangerously~~ to be dangerously unreliable, a critic and potential opponent, or leaker to the opposition; because even to mention them is to lend some authority to them (suggesting that one might believe them) and is to focus the attention of others upon them; and because for most purposes, optimum behavior by most component members of the administrative and political systems is achieved if they "take for granted" the official assumptions, ignoring these possibilities.
6. But people with long experience of the system may really be able to make more realistic assumptions--as to what will really influence the President, how long it will really take to accomplish a certain policy, how much resources will really be committed, how resolutely a certain path will be pursued--and these may be critical to realistic predictions. THEY WILL TYPICALLY HIDE THESE ASSUMPTIONS--AND THE PREDICTIONS BASED ON THEM--EXCEPT FROM CLOSE ASSOCIATES THEY TRUST NOT TO PUNISH THEM, AND WHO REQUIRE "SERIOUS" PREDICTIONS. SUCH PREDICTIONS ARE "BLACK"--COVERT, ESOTERIC, GUARDED--THEORIES OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR.



## CRISES

### Miscalculation

Politicians/diplomats believe (?) almost nothing is irreversible, irrevocable (except the initiation of large-scale war): hence, practically anything is permissible for short-term political gains. They take gambles--the odds on which are better than the public realizations--some of which go bad: they really do have consequences.

In particular, inaction, or the postponing of action, is believed rarely to have irrevocable consequences (you can always act a little later and try a little harder, pay a little more, and recapture lost ground); this reduces the number of perceived crises:

A crisis is when the consequences of short-term inaction/postponement may be serious or irrevocable. (i.e., when ensuing developments may be much worse, or irretrievably worse, than the evolution following some action--either currently conceived or to-be-found--undertaken immediately)

If a given action were clearly better (than inaction (and believed better than any others likely to be found)), then no crisis. Otherwise, urgent search: either for information clarifying the short-term choice or for new actions.

Urgency is greater if the loss/pain is not merely to be determined by the immediate decision but ~~ix~~ may be experienced/suffered in the short-run (Time-discount doesn't operate, anticipated pain looms larger; responsibility will be more clearly linked to present decision or inaction; specifically, present decision-makers will still be around, to be held responsible and punished; short-term losses look more inescapable--long-term problems can't look quite as irretrievable, no matter what current theories imply, since an answer may always be found, present theories may be wrong, or some counterbalancing development whose nature not now imagined may occur).

Urgency also increased the more that the loss will be clearly attributable to this ~~xxx~~ choice of inaction or action, and these particular decision-makers (e.g., the more immediate the loss will be; but also, the more the public is aware that a decision, involving conscious consideration of alternatives, estimates, values, is being/has been made.

~~MYX~~ JUST AS "IGNORANCE IS AN EXCUSE," INATTENTION IS AN EXCUSE.

Leader can be criticised, "held responsible for" inattention (i.e., attention to something else), but it is not regarded as reasonable inference to read as much meaning into inaction accompanied by inattention. ~~Decision-maker~~ It cannot be inferred that the decision-maker "preferred" the inaction to "rejected" alternatives--hence, that his expectations or values must be such-and-such--when it appears that he was not considering alternatives (his mind was elsewhere). He can be punished for laziness, irresponsibility, inattentiveness: but not for wrong estimates or bad values (except to the extent that these led him to be inattentive--at the earlier moment when he began to be inattentive).

In all cases here, "inaction" is to be read as "inaction or continuance of current action, current program of actions, etc." Inaction = lack of output, or, lack of change in output (e.g., suppose output is a) repetitive or patterned, regardless of input/stimulus, or b) programmed as a response to input, without inputting to or requiring output from Controller.



## CRISES

### Responsibility (RAND, Buddhists and Bureaucrats)

Many factions in emerging country wish to exercise power, to influence organisation and personnel and policy and events, without being responsible for achievement or non-achievement of a goal. (Buddhists in SVN; don't want to be in government. Military may prefer to rule behind scenes.)

They don't want to be held accountable for failure to achieve goals, and will forego credit for success; yet they want to feel powerful and to have their power known and acknowledged. These desires they can satisfy by avoiding office or situation in which they would have to implement their proposals, or invent solutions, but by exerting "unofficially" a negative influence, vetoing policies or people or arrangements by demonstrating, protesting, etc. Thus they may keep any policy from "working," on basis of claim that it has fatal flaws and must be discarded.

Office/responsibility would force them, on pain of sanctions (e.g., loss of office, prestige) to find/propose/implement positive solutions to problems, programs toward a goal; they would run the risk of being disliked by those who opposed these policies, and of being shown wrong, unwise.

"Responsibility" is not a good stimulus to coming up with new ideas, solutions, potential problems, new goals, new estimates or considerations that may invalidate current programs or policies. There may be little positive incentive for responsible person—who has a policy to carry out—to find these; and there are disincentives. The very existence of an articulated alternative—if the responsible person is not looking for one, or if he does not choose to adopt this one—can make his task harder (distract attention and support, cause doubts about his policy, uncertainty as to whether it will be continued, force him to spend time justifying his policy) and (b) increase the cost of failure (by supporting claims of those who say that he ~~knows~~ had an alternative and refused to take it).

Thus, the search for alternatives, or for "reasons to change policy; contingencies and considerations not looked at, ways this present policy can go bad" has risks for the responsible decision-maker. And it is an effort that may divert resources from his task: making present policy work, carrying out the subordinate tasks of the policy, monitoring results, etc.

That is why there must be a non-responsible RAND; and why RAND is such a pain in the neck to the responsible (especially those—staff—who have no responsibility for questioning or changing policy, only for receiving and implementing it).

Certain benefits go with responsibility; more control over resources, more continuous and detailed influence, and chance to win credit for successes; but price of these is that person must help find promising policies, and then must help make them work (he will share in punishment if they don't)—i.e., under some circumstances, he must refrain from voicing damaging criticisms, must help solve subordinate problems, must avoid pressing for too-frequent change that will, in sum, guarantee failure.



Cris

## COMMUNICATION

Two people looking at the same stream of data/evidence may come to quite different conclusions, or find it difficult to communicate, because:

1. They are testing different hypotheses.
  - a. They may be testing the same point (null) hypothesis, but against different composite alternatives:
    1. They may have different subjective probability distributions over the separate hypotheses included in the alternative; e.g., one may assign high probability to a point hypothesis which the evidence favors strongly against the null hypothesis.
    2. They may differ in the hypotheses included in their alternatives; one may totally exclude certain hypotheses included by the other.
    3. They may compare the same null hypothesis to different point hypotheses.
  - 2x b. They may have different null hypotheses; or may be testing different pairs of composite hypotheses.

Thus the question (after watching the phenomena): "Well, what do you think now?" may not elicit an intelligible response (it seems to be addressed to entirely different matters; it may seem to have "no relation" to the evidence--since the questioner may not even recognize the relevance of the data to the hypotheses the answerer is considering, and he may not know what the latter are anyway), or at any rate, no response "addressed to the question" (in the mind of the questioner).

2. Their models may differ; so that the weight of evidence associated with the data favors different hypotheses.

- a. In particular, they may differ in what they consider the areas of ambiguity. They may hear/see "noise" in different parts of the likelihood function. (Is this like including different hypotheses, or assigning different probs to different hypotheses? Or is it better represented by "flatter" likelihood functions?)
- b. These differences may show bias. A non-obvious way of biasing the likelihood--so that evidence cannot undermine one's dominant beliefs, but may strengthen them (Polanyi)--is, not to argue with the relative bearing of evidence but to reduce the weight of unfavorable evidence by emphasizing its ambiguity. (It's true that this is likely when H--my favorite hypothesis--does not occur; but it's also fairly likely, though not perhaps quite so likely, when H does occur, because of--various causes of "false alarms," instrument malfunction, operator error, obscure linkages between H and this particular phenomenon...)

This may be deliberate (propaganda). Or there may be an unconscious mechanism that sets the "tester" searching for sources of ambiguity--"listening for noise"--when unfavorable evidence is seen or imagined.

Polanyi



## Communication and Insurance

A reason for not taking out insurance (e.g., maintaining a friendship, or doing contingency planning) is:

It is desired--in order to influence someone--to give unequivocal evidence of very high confidence in something: e.g., high expectation that

- a. One will do something.
- b. Someone else will do something.
- c. Something will or will not happen.
- d. Certain resources will or will not be available.

e.g., "Souvanna Phouma ((after US strikes on DRV)) is encouraged to the point where he appears to be willing to place his confidence in the US and decline to hedge his bets with the French." Saigon 2712 Feb 65

((i.e., to prove his reliability as an ally--so as to gain benefits from our attitude and behavior--he refrains from taking steps to improve his friendship with our "unfriendly ally," steps which would protect him if we failed him but which would make us suspicious that he would take steps contrary to our interests at some point.))

--or: Why aren't we doing any contingency planning for the possibility that budget constraints on military assistance will evaporate, and McN will want to go to Congress for a large supplemental?

Because: a) Such "planning" could be done on very short notice (? This last-minute planning usually consists of throwing in all the dogs that have rightly been rejected earlier, just to swell the request.

b) Mainly: We are doing everything we can to foster the impression inside the building and out, that more money will not be available.

((You want people to work very hard to ~~prepare~~ prepare for a situation, or conversely, to avoid all resistance to a situation, which they would not do if they regarded the outcome as rather uncertain--though that might be "realistic." The only way to get them to "act as if X would happen"--fully in terms of effort, enthusiasm, imagination, obedience--is to make them believe that X is almost certain to happen; and that may require that "one" (e.g., the DOD) "actually believe" that oneself: i.e., forego any planning or even internal discussion to the contrary.


Bureaucratic problem: people will work hard on something, i.e., "as if it were certain to be useful, or pertinent, or effective," if they think it is at least highly probable. If (they) think it is only fairly probable, it may be impossible to get them to work as fast as may be essential if it is to be ready in the event that it is needed.

Hence, it may be necessary to conceal uncertainty; including, foregoing planning for alternatives, or concealing from one planning group what other planning is going on (which would generate doubt in their minds)



Morton

Issues: Pain of having this revealed — known at least to both  
(this, unlabeled to reveal + cause pain).



Known qualities.  
High control.  
Highly reliable.  
Compatible goals, beliefs, approach.

Revealed preference — Who do you pick, "when the chips are  
down" (High stakes, hard problem —  
speed, judgment, reliability).



Why Berlin analogy hard to duplicate; Berlin institutions may be inappropriate.

- 1) Berlin problem outside NATO area (like some other problems, but unlike attack on NATO nation). (and rationale for keeping out of NATO)
- 2) Sub-group established as result of WWII, Berlin crisis of 1948--prior to NATO.
- 3) Real crisis--Russian pressure (evolution of system as direct result)--vital interests--highest stakes.
- 4) Day-to-day interaction with Russians; many small choices, decisions, plans--keeping system exercised and busy.
- 5) High-level concern in each country.
- 6)

But: attractive aspects of Berlin experience:

- 1) Useful exchange of views, coordination.
- 2) Realistic, coordinated plans: as basis for ~~discussion~~ communication, starting-points in actual crises.
- 3) Institutions for quick consultation; personal relationships.
- 4) Stimulus to internal country planning; in particular, to interdepartmental discussion, planning, coordination; high-level attention and resolution.
- 5) Improved communications
- 6) Deployments, preparations.

None of above considerations applies with other contingencies.

- 1) Hypothetical, future.
- 2) Regarded by many as unlikely. (even though more likely than big attack).
- 3) Regarded by many as not calling for NATO response (and even interest in inhibiting response by others).
- 4) Lack of stimulus from Russians; either acute, or day-to-day.
- 5) Little prospect of high-level involvement, attention.



## CRISES

Effects of need for speed (some desired, in light of other considerations: e.g., privacy, secrecy, consideration or preparation or use of "radical" alternatives which others would oppose considering in less-apparently-emergency conditions; hence, may be tendency to "wait for crisis," use crises, postpone considerations until a crisis).

Distinguish between:

- x) actions that can be
- a) thought of fast
- b) planned, prepared, approved fast
- c) started fast
- d) effective fast

Need for highly or focused information and advice:

- 1) info "relevant to" immediate action alternatives, and immediate "problem"
- 2) advice on immediate alternatives: including feasibility, and invention of alternatives--relevant to "immediate problem," short-term objectives

But: small number of specialists right know this specialized, highly relevant, critical information. And limited number of people who know who might know this info--i.e., who to call.

Knowledge of what info and advice is relevant requires certain information, some of which may be withheld, or which may be hard to transmit in time:

- a) immediate problem; triggering events; attitudes of key elements, allies, staff, enemy leaders, societal groups;
- b) high-level view of immediate objectives at stake; of important constraints, "secondary criteria."
- c) certain alternatives being considered (critical info can't be specified it out this; and uncertainties, ranges, or shades may be expressed in ways that are unusable or misleading in light of "hidden" alternatives).

Moreover, problem of getting this highly focused information and advice may be constrained not only by difficulty in finding right people and framing adequate questions in time, but by problem of concealing these hidden factors from staff, or advisors: keeping them from guessing these considerations, or even the "true purpose" of the questions. Problem: QUESTIONS ARE INFORMATIVE (McKay).

One result: reliance on "briefing book" entries, books that are maintained up to date on routine basis (can be consulted without being informative as to hidden factors; or can be brought up to date); reliance on trusted advisors who can be told critical elements, even though they are not specialists on data ("They can be told the questions, safely; even though they may not be best at answering.")

Problem of competition for solution of crisis problem --hence, need for secrecy, speed, closed staff--increased by emergency nature of situation:

- 1) situation invites promotion of radical solutions, by groups in public, Congress, allies, normally quiescent because their preferred courses so obviously inappropriate or unsupportable in normal periods; i.e., crisis activates certain political pressures, stimulates pressure for radical turns;
- 2) those with "solutions" will see them as highly important and urgent; they will use extraordinary means to have them considered, adopted. (rather than "letting Lyndon do it."



Why do passers-by simply ignore a clanging burglar alarm; or air raid siren (or fall-out warning)?

## WARNING AND SURPRISE

Certain surprise-prone events have following properties:

- 1) Prior probability is extremely, extremely low (e.g., attack on Pearl Harbor, attack through Ardennes, missiles in Cuba).  
(in fact, possibility may not have been thought of at all: either by any individual, or by a bureaucratic level: or may have been dropped from consideration and not recovered. In this case, no incoming data will raise its probability--which is effectively zero--until some data--such as the attack itself--"suggests"/generates the hypothesis and simultaneously gives it near-certain probability))
- 2) Most relevant data is quite ambiguous: doesn't raise prob appreciably.
- 3) Certain relevant data appears--e.g., to the layman, or even to the insider who is not a specialist in this source or who lacks certain special information--to have extremely great evidential weight: enough to convert even a very low prior prob to a high prob, or at least, to a prob high enough to trigger preparatory or "insurance" or information-gathering actions.  
But for reasons known only to the specialist, or for reasons of special collateral information known at the time to those who must interpret or act on signals, even these signals are fairly ambiguous; their evidential weight is much reduced, and is inadequate to raise a very low prob to levels that would trigger appropriate preparation or response.
- 4) It may also be true that the costs or risks of ~~any~~ "appropriate" actions (i.e., appropriate if hypothesis were true, or highly likely) are seen as very high--perhaps much higher than "public" would think, for reasons not known or not weighed heavily by public.

The effect is that signals/evidence which may appear--to the public, or even to a relative insider (or even to the receiver himself, when he reviews the evidence later with some loss of memory)--as "unequivocal warning", simply stir no significant or adequate response whatever: because they lacked, at the time, the ~~moderate~~ very great evidential weight needed to convert a very low probability into a very high probability.

Any one of these factors may be the critical one; and any one, or more, may have a value which is hidden to the observer or the public, because of deliberate secrecy, or lack of expertise or experience, or lack of particular information bearing only on this one incident. The effect of this difference in appreciation is that the resultant surprise seems surprising: inexplicable (and gives rise to suspicions of total incompetence, irresponsibility, or hidden and sinister motives; this interpretation is always risked, in fact is likely, as a result of investigation into "surprising surprises": the investigation is likely to turn up some "warning" that will appear to someone as "so unequivocal" that it suggests or proves to them the culpability of those who failed to respond.)

Examples:



Crises are situations of emergency decision-making: of search for a policy, with high stakes at risk, under an urgent deadline.

1. Why is the choice being made under emergency conditions? Why don't they know--why didn't they decide earlier--what they want to do...or what the problem is, the relevant objectives, the alternatives? Why are they working at night, over weekends, bypassing normal channels?

2. These questions are asked not only later, by historians and political scientists, but at the time, by Congress, the public, the newspapers. The wrong answers will lead to a mark of "failure" of the Administration: failure to foresee, to prepare, to forestall. This character of a test affects the stakes for the decision-maker: (a) if he succeeds, if he "saves" the situation or avoids significant loss, he will get no bonus for doing it in as a last-minute save; he may pay a penalty anyway, or forego some credit for the success, because of the earlier failures, of foresight, administration, informing the public, etc (so he has an incentive to strive to offset this--while in the spotlight--by notably graceful or dramatic "management" during the crisis). (b) more importantly, if he "fails"--if the outcome is bad--there will be a presumption that he could have done much better if he had dealt with the problem in a more timely fashion (unless there are very persuasive reasons to believe that "the problem could not have been foreseen, or prepared for, earlier").

In other words, experiencing the problem as a crisis--or as a surprise--tends to heighten the cost of failure (i.e., the cost to the decision-maker, not the cost to the nation); to avoid failure, to lower the probability of failure, he may be tempted to pay a price he wouldn't otherwise pay; for he will publicly be defined as "success," or to accept risks of worse failure to lower his overall probability of any failure. (Taylor on December 20). Thus, "surprise" or "crisis" may create a divergence between "public" stakes (as they might appear to someone in the same spot who was in no way responsible for events or preparations or estimates leading up to the emergency situation. Because of responsibility for the past, given individuals have special motives: to conceal, to offset, to excise, to avoid, to produce, to justify. And in particular, those who are responsible for there being a crisis have special motives not to add failure in the crisis to their failure to avoid the crisis.



Flexibility: If info will be available — as a matter of choice, <sup>or</sup> at a cost — then one has two choices:

a) whether, and how much, info to buy; how much to pay for given signals, tests, observations.

b) whether and how much flexibility to buy — to prepare to exploit more info.

Buying more flexibility <sup>(may?)</sup> raises the value of (given) info. <sub>or additional</sub>

Buying more info raises the value of given (additional) flexibility.

If no info is available, flex. has no value.

If given info is available (i.e. signals are coming, without cost) then buy flexibility "until" ~~the value of flex. is zero~~ until this no longer increases expected value.

? "Postponing decision" is (for the purpose of ?) acquiring info, or of ~~acquiring~~ using info - to - be - acquired. (or allowing for change in <sup>values</sup> model <sup>attention</sup>) (info on events; or, change in preferences; or (another definition) of one's own opinions or values, through analysis; or, changes in opinion/values due to reflection + analysis).

"Flex" "allows us" to postpone decision.



## Value of information

The zero-sum game assumptions underestimate the value of information (intelligence) on the intentions of the enemy--even if he is rational (but believes, perhaps, that we may not be; or that we may believe he is not; or that...), but especially if there is some uncertainty as to his view of the payoffs. OUR OWN PAYOFFS REPRESENT A DIFFICULT TASK OF CONSTRUCTION, OF INVENTION, OF ANALYSIS, WITH ROOM FOR DISAGREEMENT EVEN AMONG CLOSE COLLEAGUES, AND INEVITABLY ELEMENTS OF ARBITRARINESS OR CHANCE ASSIGNMENT. TO BELIEVE THAT WE CAN KNOW THE OPPONENT'S PAYOFFS WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE--THAT WE CAN REPRODUCE THE CORRESPONDING ANALYSIS AND CONSTRUCTION GOING ON ON HIS SIDE--IS TO DELUDE OURSELVES. But it is especially unrealistic to imagine that we do know his payoffs, and his assumptions on our payoffs; yet do not have a basis for fairly definite bets on his likely course of action! It would be very unusual to have this much knowledge about the opponent yet ~~retain the right~~ to have his choice of strategy remain entirely ambiguous.

Minimaxing implies either acting "as if" his choice were entirely ambiguous to us--which will generally imply low value for information (since the possible content of the information to be received will be regarded as highly ambiguous)--or acting "as if" we ~~were~~ had definite expectations corresponding to the "least favorable distribution"--which would imply 0 value for information, in a zero-sum game.

A more realistic approach would assume ~~were~~ expectations less definite than the latter (so that there is some chance--perhaps large--of receiving information of great value) and less ambiguous than the former (so that we have some definite estimate of the minimum chances of receiving useful information).



[What will spread necessary decisions? In way of <sup>advised</sup> confidence, info, comm, available starting, transparency, execution, control, feedback, planning, exercise agreements with others.]

[C & C systems should become self-conscious of the useful states of readiness that are possible & helpful: there are Basic Symbols for state of the world.]

[Investigate:   
 (risks of:   
 1. Motives against:   
 0000) Control   
 000) Learning activity   
 00) Insurance   
 0) Planning   
 1) Flexibility

addition to inertial forces, other  
uses for resources, lack of initiative,  
lack of awareness, laziness, uncertainty

2) Comm with:   
 staff   
 business   
 Congress   
 public   
 allies   
 enemy   
 } consulting   
 informing

Actual state of these matters   
 still   
 view point: actual effects in crises

Forecasting & preparing crises & wars

national, control, measures to alleviate   
 fears of these constraints

3) Experiment; exercise

4) Reducing uncertainty; gaining info

5) Reducing ambiguity of policy

6) Alternative options

7) Centralization

8) Postponing decision

9) Deciding

10) Reducing risk of surprise

11) Recognizing/reporting uncertainty

[Jones: reason for belief at high headquarters that "pilots can learn only one target" (though really they know all their US bombing-test targets);

en 12. a) Need for more airplanes (airplane-intensive war plans).

b) Need to improve planning

c) Fear that alternatives will slow decision; encourage Pres. to postpone, make it harder to decide with given info (Not necessarily true)

d) Lack of confidence - choice by decision-makers



## ORIENTED TALK

Themes:

1. Action by: a) governments as bureaucracies  
b) Heads of State as individuals
2. President's problem of anticipation: to predict opposing (and domestic) bureaucratic behavior, and opposing individual's behavior. Best situated to do this, in terms of access and experience; but hampered by lack of "research" time, temperament, limited sample of experience, lack of theoretical underpinning. Result: Pres decisions reflect his special knowledge and guesses about such factors: but still, surprises on both sides.
3. If system is to support Pres, or get in act at all, must anticipate both opposing side and also the President (and his close advisors). Again, surprises: reflecting bad understanding of own "side" and of Pres.
4. List surprises, leading to crises:
5. Difficulties in improving understanding:
6. Pres as Black Box.
7. Bureaucracy--ours and theirs--as black box.
8. Implications of (1): fact that opposing moves are made largely by bureaucracies (rather than an individual), and that, on the other hand, certain key moves are made by a special individual: the Head of State (in US case: the President, a politician, a no-bureaucrat, an officer).
- How does US gov behave differently (e.g., as seen or predicted by its opponents) because it consists of a bureaucracy-headed-by-a-politician (and acted upon by Congress, press, allies) rather than a single ex "rational bureaucrat"? (Robinson Crusoe politics).
- Surprise; Failure; Privacy/Secrecy; Internal Shuttling;
9. Hidden History: effects of secrecy (once, in all), compartmentation, Pres role (specifically protected), on understanding--including President's of past crises.
10. Crises as Failures: defensive attitude toward studying, revealing nature of decision process.

1. Situation: 2. Planning, Thinking, Decision-making, Action



Romer, 1 Aug:

1. Since taking job, he would now be more likely to ask: "How does the President see his problem?" Importance of question: a) President is more personally influential on handling than he had realized earlier; b) answer is less obvious, more unpredictable, less open to the bureaucracy than he had realized.

To ask this question is not to have it answered. Only 4 or 5 people in a given situation are likely to know President's private thoughts, and they will vary from situation to situation, depending partly on nature of problem.

((One head of state is likely to ask this question concerning the motives of another. But he may or may not have adequate information, or have good enough judgment, to arrive at a good answer. He may think he knows, and be wrong, and be led to disastrous judgment (inexplicable to his own bureaucracy, which does not know his calculations). Hypothesis: to a widely-underestimated degree, the major actions of a nation reflect this sort of calculation by its head of state (concerning his problem and his perception of his "colleagues" problems. Heads of state guess that this process is going on, is important, and know the nature of the considerations; but they may or may not be able to guess accurately--any better than anyone else--what those others are calculating at a given moment, or how their calculations are affecting their actions.

Nevertheless, it is useful to: a) ask the question; b) make better guesses as to what you don't or can't know, and how that should affect estimates; c) know importance of trying to find out, and what to try to find out; d) at any given, point, recognize tentativeness of answers.

2. On political motives: elections, trades, alliances. Pres will expound his reasoning on rejecting or postponing a proposal to close staff like Bundy; gradually they will be educated on his thinking and will anticipate it. So Bundy and Kacer will include in their own staff recommendations their estimates of the risks implicit in a decision w.r.t. the campaign, etc; political reasons for modifying statement, not telling someone, postponing, etc. These reasons, if accepted, will neither be explained to the bureaucracy nor will decision always be attributed to the President.

3. Instances of Pres (hidden) decisions: LBJ flat decision that there must not be war between Turks and Greeks. This ruled out certain possibilities for encouraging a resolution. Hidden because freedom of action can be improved by hiding decision. Also, one doesn't tell an ally who wants to act that he will absolutely not be permitted to act; save that till the "crunch" (postpone it; it may not be necessary; then, produce ad hoc reasons if possible). Rather, tell him that "first, do this or that; use force only as last resort, if these fail."

(Eisenhower decision on Suez; hidden; Dulles as front man; assurance that force would be acceptable if all else failed.

To some extent, we revealed Turk plans in our initial statements.

But such postponing puts some burden of obligation on us to solve problem our way; and if our means fail, we have led them to believe that we will go along with force.



Stennis: Interim Report on the Cuban Military Buildup  
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,  
U.S. Senate, May 9 1963

"The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonable credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.

A difference between expert and layman in interpretation of "evidence";  
expert knows

At PH, just as we stopped the U-2 flights over Cuba, in order to avoid incidents, we stopped all ship traffic over routes northwest of Hawaii, which meant no visual sighting of the approaching Jap convoy.

Who was aware of pattern of Soviet military aid to Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq; wasn't this important in making distinctions as to acceptable aid to Cuba? Did public, Congress realize?

1. Technological surprise (speed of deployment; range of Zeros, shallow torpedos in HI)
2. Cry Wolf phenomenon.
3. wishful thinking
4. ((effect of preconceptions and early results on the collection process))
5. ((commitments in intelligence community on predictions))
6. Sov. deceptive statements.
7. ~~like~~ role of accident, bad luck: weather over Cuba, radio blackout (HI) political constraints: U-2 shootdowns.
8. Previous Soviet behavior: never in satellites ((SUPPOSE K HAD STARTED BY PUTTING MISSILES IN SATELLITES; AND THAT WE HAD PREDICTED MISSILES IN CUBA))
9. Enemy sec.



Yarmolinsky: 2

What is wanted in the campaign oratory of an incumbent Administration is Wordsworth's recipe for poetry: Emotion recollected in tranquillity.



Intelligence in Crises (i.e., intelligent behavior; learning, adaptation, appropriateness, coordination)

The government has (almost) no memory. (Note resistance to, lack of, studies of operations and crises; gaps and inadequacies of existing studies). Lack of continuity of personnel; continuity of relationships; experienced people drop out of discussion as it goes higher; lack of files, retention of drafts, etc; (Laos)

What experience is likely to be applied at higher levels? The personal experience of the top people? --very short in new administration; this means that vivid experiences of a Sec or Pres are likely to have great influence in shaping new perceptions, regardless of real relevance, and to have impact on a wide range of new choices, while older national experiences are ignored, though more relevant.

Laos: Dominant time lags are involved in the process of forming and considering policy, not in the transmission of messages. When decisions must all be referred back to higher authority: 1) necessary to get the attention of higher authority; delays; 2) committees, consultation, coordination necessary, delays, time-consuming; 3) higher authority must be briefed on background, problem; 4) at the level where "broad considerations" enter, controversy is keen--on goals, facts, policies, and other problems that should be getting attention;

((Is all this true in a "recognized crisis," unlike Laos? (Of course, during crisis, all these problems are accentuated for a "quiet crisis" that may be going on elsewhere.))

Should gov adopt "activist" policy--of sort where delegation is undesired because of "threshold effects" of minor choices, chance of major problems or escalation--so that high-level people must take part in control--when it can be foreseen that situation will not compete effectively, day to day, for the attention of the top level, so that above delays are inevitable?

Perhaps adoption of activist policy could be predicated on the availability, at the time, of a person whom higher authorities are willing to entrust with delegated authority. (e.g., Ambassador; Asst Sec).

#### On Photos:

Patterns of impact, inference, interpretation:

a) Negative evidence weighed (too?) strongly: Sept 5, 1962; note similarity of DIA reaction to negative evidence of removal of missiles, (and absence of positive evidence--because no flights), 29 Oct--1 Nov; Missile gap, 1958-1961 (e.g., MRBMs); (when then miss. & how are confident, on "negative" basis, on "positive" basis?)

b) Given early, positive evidence: tendency to assume that situation will not change drastically or quickly; Sept 5, 62; Sept, 1961 (underestimated speed of introduction of SS-7, hardening, rate of introduction);

c) tendency (?) to "wait till the--"hard"--evidence is in"...before drawing conclusions, doing contingency planning, scheduling meetings

(despite the fact that there may be long "accidental" delays in acquiring hard evidence; by the way, are these delays themselves regarded as if they were evidence ("We still have no evidence of...latest evidence still so



Then

## Reasons for Explan. Memorandum:

- a) Assessment of Pres. by importance of issues
- b) Need for fast, good comms
- c) Control of message  
But only one middle staff cut out? Excommunication
- d) Speed
- e) Improved understanding of staff planning  
(some disunity, suspicion, loss of confidence)
- f) Need for message from opponents; (allies)
- g) Failure. Need to minimize vulnerability to  
immediate opposition - at least in presentation, rationale,  
if not advice.
- h) Issue of publicity; need to conceal decision  
process; estimates, alternatives considered. (Comparison  
of feasibility, possible effectiveness, of rejected alternatives  
suggestion of them as possibilities). Need to conceal nature  
of decisions; thoughts; over-illumination of motives, etc.  
[some].

i) Pres. (U.S.) prestige as central issue

Diffidence & withdrawal of participation, & loss of influence  
National assets, national identity, etc.



UMA Talk

1. Behavior of key individuals in large bureaucracies.
2. The psychology of secrecy; strains imposed by requirement for secrecy.
3. Role of emotions, anxieties, personal risks in organizational behavior.
4. Need for improved prediction--even if only tiny improvement--of opposing initiatives, expectations, interpretation/inferences, responses. And this requires better prediction of our own behavior--and the patterns it presents to an observer.
5. What constitutes "dangerous provocation"--what puts intolerable pressure for hostile countermove on opponent--or us? Nature of "critical vein," humiliation, threat...

Call William Poller, NIH

Oliver Rosen

760 Westwood Plaza

CA

Dr. Leslie Korman

Dept. Psych. SC PMG

41900 Summit

665-3111 X 1743



crises are dangerous--for all.

Not only in Cuba 11, but in Indochina 1954, Quemoy 55, Quemoy 58: we were closer to major violence than public realized at time, and closer than enemy anticipated.

Why? And why didn't opponent anticipate? (Why hadn't we anticipated? Often: because opponent's action seemed improbable because our own response seemed "obvious" to us. Why hadn't it to opponent?)

Why is it surprising to opponent that it is dangerous to produce a humiliating surprise for us? Because they overestimate ability to produce a fait accompli; underestimate our ability to move fast and violently when motivated to do so by the conditions they have created? As if speed of victim's response, and decisiveness were independent of the nature of the "problem" presented and the way it arose; aggressor may have extrapolated from victim's behavior in situations that threatened or reduced his national security but did not in fact create the precise sorts of pressures that the aggressor's action does (no political pressure, no deception, no public commitment. Aggressor has wrong theory.

Is key to unexpected behavior, the linkage of national and personal crisis? Ike's acceptance of responsibility for U-2?

((If Summit were to be sunk by K anyway: suppose Ike had disclaimed responsibility for U-2, as K had proposed?))

If faits accompli were tried only when they were almost sure to work, they would not be so productive of crisis, so dangerous; a good theory of the fait accompli <sup>in aggressor's hands</sup> might produce more of them, but avoid the most dangerous ones. It would also alert victim, reduce opportunities for successful ones.

Cuba and Suez: Suez was Cuba if we had waited, announced; then acted.



I come to problem as a recent Outsider; let me try to exploit that, draw that insights ~~xxx~~ that may be more readily available to one who can still remember how things looked to him as an "informed Outsider" and be self-conscious of the difference the info makes.

### Educating Crisis Decision-makers

What is the "crisis decision-making community"?

It is a subset of all those concerned with national security, including all the armed forces, diplomacy, intelligence, R&D, procurement, etc. But still not a small subset.

If it includes all those who make "decisions" that (within the time-frame, let us say, of the "events leading up to the crisis"--an arbitrary cut-off, which might commence with certain enemy decisions, or certain political or technical events) that do or may significantly influence the President's choice of national policy, or its major aspects of the implementation or consequences of that choice, then the community is very large. If it includes, that is to say, all those who make deliberate choices that are effectively "decisive, ultimate, irreversible"--because of constraints of time, authority, information, ~~xx~~ competence, or feedback loops, within the organization--that significantly affect the flow of information to the President, or the flow of ~~implementation~~ information to those who must implement the President's decision, etc., then it is very large.

~~Thatxxxxxxxincludes~~

It would then include those who influence the process of collection of ~~xx~~ data from the outside world--the priorities, means of collection, schedules, constraints, transmission--and its ~~interpret~~ preliminary and intermediate processing, reporting, analysis, interpretation, before it reaches the President; and those who answer questions about status of forces, system capabilities, alternative modes of behavior and their possible consequences; and those who draw the President's attention to relevant national goals, political considerations, dangers, costs...

An even greater number of people in staffs "aid and participate" in the process, but in ways that can be monitored and modified or reversed within the time-frame of the crisis-process by superiors or colleagues or other units; but those who make genuine, irreversible choices that affect the way in which alternatives and probabilities and "positions" are presented to the President for his judgment and decision are still a very large body.

For each of these deciders, his preconceptions, model, information experience, personal goals and view of larger problems and goals, matter.

We can't investigate these for individuals (except at top); or prepared individuals optimally to meet specific future crises. But are there likely to be systematic failings ~~xx~~ that are important and remediable, that would be relevant to a range of potential situations?

~~Yxxxxxxxincludes~~

Parochialism, in perspective and knowledge of current and past actions. Ignorance of true past history and knowledge of false past history (from uncensored, departmental experience supplemented by newspapers, official accounts and histories).



Do new Insiders do well enough; learn enough, fast enough? And do they avoid learning some seriously wrong lessons (as well as some right ones) from their early, isolated experiences?

2.

A combination of unlearning and education may be valuable to:

- 1) All new Insiders, including those who have broad access to current information (the Presidential Group);
- 2) Tested Insiders, whose experience is still narrow; (after 2-4 years)
- 3) Mature Insiders, whose past experience is warped by departmental boundaries. This includes nearly everybody, even with clearances.
- (( 4) High-level Insiders who know what can happen and how things happen but not why they happen as they do, why patterns recur, how patterns might be changed; comparison and analysis of past experience, or criticism of their own "theories." The circle of people who share their universe of discourse is truly small, and inbred; they can learn wrong lessons not for lack of information, experience, perspective or intelligence, but just from lack of discussion and criticism. This is not, ~~xxxx~~ as perhaps in the above cases, something that can be remedied by lessons at the start of their term.))

But lessons--that are not merely more wrong, misleading lessons--can only be prepared by those who have sufficient clearance and sufficient access to interdepartmental data, studies and perspectives. and enough time to repair the critical gaps in their own experience and knowledge--which are inevitable, since there is no ~~an~~ adequate education available for this teaching job as yet (except a term or two as President, or perhaps Special Asst. for NSA).

e.g., one must be aware of the crucial role in crises of those whose job is to provide fast, precise, unequivocal, highly focussed information relevant to the urgent needs of the President, i.e., information on outside world; and role of organizations and individuals who influence that process.

Knowledge of SI alone is inadequate, even misleading; for that is (is it not?) relatively passive, uncontrolled in rate and output of useful info, involving little risk or interaction with enemy, requiring little decision-making or difficult-to-conceal activity, or occasion for "incidents" and protests; process of producing does not involve high-level decision-makers, or interact with crisis-process.

It is the "active" part of the intelligence collection process that is least appreciated by Outsider and that forms central part of crisis-process.

Here is where a New Insider could profit from knowing how problems have arisen before, how alternatives looked in past, actual consequences of choices, relevant considerations, past enemy tactics and agency biases.



The Cuban crisis left us with ambivalent attitudes towards crises and the threat of violence. At once, it reminded us of the ultimate risks that are now implicit in challenges and conflicts that can explode into nuclear war, and ~~fixing~~ it demonstrated that the threat of such a conflict, with its attendant threat of explosion, could achieve important national ends. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that if the risks of such tactics were to be tolerable at all it could only be because those risks were being controlled as wisely and effectively as possible, by those with the best information and the broadest responsibility.

Ambivalence, too, toward the notion of "management"--because of denunciations of the "management of news". Control of news was

Crisis as Communication

Barriers for ~~Not~~ Communicating (Privacy, Secrecy, Discretion),  
within gov, public, opponents, allies, opposing + allied policies

Center: allies, thoughts, K; Release idea of responsibility for action  
for threatening, something, something, something  
being

Reflections, consciousness of gov, opponents, allies as complex system

What is a Provocation: (Thompson vs. Dallas theories)

What events trigger secret, high-level considerations of immediate commitment  
to violent action  
on way

Crisis as Failures (on both sides). Reasons not to plan, prepare...

Crisis as Surprise (sequence of, on both sides, "Provocations")

Crisis as Communication: How common factor, that my prediction of my behavior  
Adversary communications: with multiple audiences, need to plan  
better than yours: that I am likely to

Crisis as Unilateral Actions  
Summitry

takes certain limited actions, that I might  
tell some unilateral actions?

Crisis takes place

at high noon - with the citizens  
watching behind their shutters

Crisis as Propaganda



**Possible patterns:**

1. For preparatory opponents' actions to lead to exaggerated reports of specific, observable activity that will be disproved by photos, with the effects that: a) these reports are discredited and essentially ignored, alternative explanations not being adequately explored ("Where there's no fire, after all, there's no real smoke.") b) Later, correct reports of similar appearance are regarded as implausible.

Basis for the early exaggeration: sources may report inferences, predictions, rumors, as concrete, observed activities, in specific locations.



## Questions:

1. Under what circumstances would X not have been a "crisis"? What would have prevented it from arising at all?

Under what circumstances does it make sense to talk of a "quibt" crisis or a "prolonged crisis?" When the possibility of military action looms for a long time? (Komer: India-Pakistan as a quiet crisis).

2. In retrospect, how might actual crises have been much worse? What could have gone wrong? What would have horribly confused things--say, given current interpretations of the situation? How could Soviets have done much better?

3. What are ways of scoring US crisis performance? What ways are actually used? i.e., what are individuals' criteria of success or failure? What are differences among these; how do differences affect behavior? What is seen at time as possible losses or benefits; wat later?

4. follow ng (2) above: Could actual crises be points of departure, starting-point scenarios, for modified scenarios of "might-have-been" crises. Take situation as it existed--and agency positions, expectations, differences of opinion, objectives, as they actually were, in full richness of detail and background--and ask the people who actually participated how situat on might have been affected by certain modifications or developments,

((Analogy: the seminar phase of a two-sided wargame: talking through alternative courses) (Check with ~~xxx~~ Weiner, de Weerd)

5. Is it an objective to eliminate crises? Or are crises (including non-military crises) equivalent to high-level decision points? i.e., are they simply what a decision point, a choice, a commitment, looks like at high level? (No: there are many decision points that do not feel like a crisis, nor do they call for military action). Are

ARE THERE FUNCTIONS OF CRISIS? Suppose there were no experiences like crises; wuld some goals be harder to achieve, would some problems become harder?

Compare a fire station, a hospital emergency clinic, a police desk: the latter, particularly, ~~ix~~ exists precisely to deal with the need for imminent use of force: are these calls to function experienced as crises? Howmuch planning is there; how much reliance on SOP, checklists?

6. HOW MUCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS DONE WITHIN GOVERNEMENT, RELATED TO SECURITY AND CRISES? BY AGENCIES? How much use of checklists, SOPs, distribution lists? Are there parallels to Emergency Action Files in State, CIA, White House? Are these preparations coordinated, known to each other? How do they mesh? ARE THEY USED IN CRISIS?

(Task for Bennington)



## Questions and tasks

### 7. Analyze ~~Dimensions~~ Dimensions of Surprise.

(e.g.: Was precipitating event anticipated; in planning, in intelligence estimates, by individuals at different levels, by Pres; as possibility, as past experience, as probable. If not, various sorts of reasons why not. Were preparations made: for better short-run anticipation (alarm), for response? What sort; by whom; with what effectiveness?

### 8. Investigate Alerting procedures: in different agencies, at different levels and components of given agency. What are plans; are they coordinated? Jointly exercised? Are they actually used; what is history of this? If not, why not? How modified in actual use? Why/when would they not be used?

What do different agencies know of each other's alerting procedures, plans? What do we know of Allies'? Of Soviet Union's? China? Russia?

What do they know of ours?

What have reactions actually been in past to alerting measures?

How have alerts actually been executed in past? How much is known of this at time to high-level commanders? How much has this been studied? How do exercise results correlate with actual practice? How do both correlate to plans?

What interagency, inter-Allied problems have arisen in alerts?

How well are various alerting procedures coordinated to warning procedures?

What messages do various alerts convey? How much noise? What do we know of enemy, Allied, public interpretation? How does lack of coordination affect this?

### 9. Evaluate past crises, in terms of what losses were risked, experienced, avoided; what benefits.

Examine, with retrospective data, how courses of action actually proposed but not adopted might have worked out (e.g., total blockade of Cuba;

### 10. Compile list of standard action proposals in crises; examine what evidence can be brought to bear upon their effectiveness: e.g., evidence as to their effect if they had been used; evidence as to their effect when actually used in past. How much has this been studied?

e.g.: blockade

boycott

declarations of various kinds (including Congressional, public)

demonstrations of various kinds

harassing, spoofing

sabotage; covert action

assassination

mobilizations



11. What do top people see as "rules of the game"? in various areas.  
How do these differ from explicit, admitted rules; those known to publics?  
What sorts of actions are perceived as violations of the rules? What are  
emotional and behavior reactions to such breaks?



## Anticipation of Crises

"Hard" evidence amounts to highly unequivocal evidence that, say, missiles are already in place.

No evidence that missiles will be emplaced could be considered "hard," I take it--except perhaps preparatory activities already taking place that could only be associated with missiles and that would not be undertaken unless emplacement was regarded as virtually certain. (a "hard" decision, or commitment).

To what extent were expectations of missiles held low until "hard" evidence--i.e., until evidence had been received that missiles were actually there?

How important was the belief that there would be adequate time for response after missiles were first discovered--that missiles would take a long time to prepare? Did this lead to false confidence that a negative finding would not be invalidated for a considerable time?

Were many SA-2 missiles wrongly estimated in terms of size, as MRBMs? What difference in reporting is now discernible between those who were describing SAMs and those who were reporting MRBMs?

What were characteristics of reports after mid-Sept that made them more convincing?

What is basis for conviction that all missiles were removed from Cuba? (Note absence of a correspondence between missiles previously observed and those taken out; proof that it is possible to conceal missiles from our observation or reporting). (Note also: not enough missiles removed for reload--48--and spares, nor IRBMs). (also: agent reports). (continued presence of combat troops).

Stennis ~~SAC~~ Subcomm:

*revised Oct 27*

- a) Not until after a confirming picture obtained on Oct 25 did int. comm. identify presence of SU organized ground combat forces (low-level photo, combined with reanalysis of previous photos)
- b). On Oct. 22, int comm estimated SU personnel in Cuba at 8000-10,000. Now believed at least 22000.. (earlier passenger ships ~~xxx~~ troop-loaded; and arrivals in cargo ships). (even 22000 may not account for all equipment).
- c) Since Pres. didn't know of combat units on Oct. 22, he couldn't include them in demands for withdrawal.

(Was it considered adding these to list?)

- d) Not until photo on Oct. 14 that int. comm concluded missiles had been introduced.

(Conclusion reached near end of Sept. that there was a suspect MRBM site in Pinar del Rio province; photos proposed; Oct 14.

Sept. 28; photos taken, evaluated on Oct. 9 ?) as IL-28's.

No evidence of photo gap. Flights: Aug 29; Sept 5; planned for Sept 10 but cancelled (?); Sept. 17 (cloud cover); Sept 26, 29, Oct 5, Oct 7; these flights completed coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention (but: no exploring; no recovery of earlier areas; skirting of SAMs; and good weather requirements?)

SAC given responsibility on Oct 12 (since SAMs to be overflown).

No evidence of SAC-CIA fight. SAC flew 17 high altitude sorties between 14-22 Oct.



## PRESTIGE ISSUES

1. Exchanges on issues of telling US how many Sov troops were being removed from Cuba, Jan--June 1963
2. Interpretation of Missile Crisis as a deliberate attack on administration; effect of Pres of having warnings ignored, predictions falsified. (JFK-Mikoyan)
3. Interpretation of SAMs, buildup, as a personal affront to Pres. (Sorenson-Dob).
4. Dob-Rusk: feeling in Moscow that US didn't pay enough attention to Sov prestige.
5. K to de Gaulle, Macmillan, on Oct 15, 1960; re Eisenhower behavior in U-2 shootdown.
6. SUEZ: a) interpretation of Nasser's "blackmail" by Dulles; b) Nasser reaction to rejection; c) Eden reaction to Nasser action; d) English-French need to punish, humiliate Nasser; e) English-French reaction to Dulles' "deception"; f) Eisenhower-Dulles reaction to English-French deception, defiance, "aggression", and timing before election;
7. Bay of Pigs; a) role of earlier campaign statements; b) Stevenson reaction to deception, lies? c) Adenauer concern for US prestige.



or indirect, to the Soviet bloc that are feared. The basic threat may be that the public, armed with this information, would demand action, or an ally would demand inaction, which the responsible decisionmakers thought inappropriate. *It may come from the opponents' position, that the decision must be left, but they, the other leaders' hands; the necessary may even be required.*

But what of the consequences? By doing without staffs and complex interchanges among departments, by contracting a ring of participants in the policy process to those at the very apex of the pyramid of power, one obviously risks the loss of all those benefits for which the edifice of government and bureaucracy exist. The chances are *presumably* increased of commitment to policies that are infeasible, unwieldy, excessively costly or risky, or grossly inefficient, *The chances that new policies, satisfying more fully than the old a multitude of objectives and constraints, will be invented, developed, & administered, are presumably decreased.* (If this were not the case, then Washington could be emptied of bureaucrats to an extent that might astound even a radical foe of Big Government. This is not to say that a less adequate, imaginative, or efficient policy will inevitably emerge from decisionmaking by a committee of principals than from normal bureaucratic procedure; it is a presumption about average results and risks.) A less obvious risk, suggested to me by Chet Cooper (CIA) is that decisionmakers who exploit the opportunity, or are forced by events, to become "their own desk officers," "their own estimators and planners," may become committed, officially and emotionally, to particular estimates, proposals, and considerations in a manner common to their subordinates, losing the detachment and breadth of perspective which they alone are normally in a position to bring to the policy process.

A little-noted but potent consequence of the freezing out of staffs from the policy process may be that opinions, judgments, considerations



and goals which the principals have heretofore concealed from their own staffs, for one or another reason, and which have therefore had little influence on the earlier planning process or even upon the overt policies of the Government, now become suddenly effective when the principals are "forced" to arrive at decisions in seclusion from influence ("interference") from their staffs. When the principals share, to a large degree, these concealed attitudes, and when the staffs or governmental organs that were earlier influential but are now excluded from decisionmaking share, for their part, a divergent set of values, preconceptions, or objectives, the result <sup>of internal unity</sup> can be sharp shifts in policy from earlier planning, declarations, or non-crisis actions. <sup>but the same is true of external unity, and the time may be somewhat later in the process</sup> This result is paradoxical from the perspective of a simple view of government in which one abstracts from the problems of internal dissent, of ~~complex~~ complex structure, of limitations on control, <sup>of "captivity to staffs,"</sup> and from the variety of reasons that the President or a departmental head may sign letters, approve plans, issue declarations, make speeches, and order programs, <sup>all</sup> prepared for him by subordinates, for some considerable period, despite the fact that he is personally uneasy with or even consciously disapproving of the policies reflected in these instruments. We lack, on the whole, adequate theories of complex organizational behavior that would lead us to predict such phenomena. Nevertheless, this sharp and abrupt turning point ~~complex~~ (one of the dictionary definitions of "crisis") as principals are released from staff anchors was strikingly evident in Nassau in 1962; moreover, slight changes in circumstances during the Cuban missile crisis might as well have resulted in Ex Comm decisions that would have amazed and dismayed intimate staff assistants, as well as observers less close.



The crisis as dialog

The crisis as summit

The crisis as internal security (Stebbins, etc. and).

The crisis as sublime

The crisis as failure

The crisis as test of the President

Pres. prestige on stake (Newstead).

Dialog — communication sets target or expectation

Summit — attitudes of leadership

Internal summit — to coordinate, to control messages

to convince, force expectations, to avoid

unwanted interpretations, speculation, isolation

(aim: to maintain secrecy, produce

fact sample)

1) % <sup>and back</sup> has control of policy, usual generally

actions by a) appoint, b) recall, c) encourage, d) isolate

c) Must confront fairly, unambiguously

failure



Challenges of "social-chemical" intelligent behavior: can cope with  
situations not envisaged by designer

[Study on essential for a crisis / TV were alerting  
and response system

2nd: given incentives for <sup>evolving</sup> disrupting i.e. surprises from  
unready system: must be able to recover from surprise. When caught  
in a crisis (under many of the inhibitions to adaptive activity are  
reduced — to return soon after crisis)

Costs of Perceptive Planning for Crises and Wars

(Effects of perceptive goals & purposes & preparations on  
plans & preparations and on actual operations in crisis)

Note fear of lessening one's ability to muddle through, to  
improvise to meet short-run problem, by preparations for  
long run. What are potential conflicts here?

What are the "requirements for muddling through"?